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In many political reforms around the globe we observe a common trend that 
might be characterized as ‘decentralization’ or ‘devolution’. Through 
recasting constitutions, creating sub-national legislatures or simply through 
devolving more and more administrative responsibilities to already existing 
sub-national authorities those political reforms try to bring the government 
home ‘to the people’. The coming-home of the government is seen by many 
as a way to improve responsiveness and heighten the democratic quality and 
the (out-put oriented) legitimacy of the political system by trying to match 
policy output more closely to citizen’s preferences. It is also seen as injecting 
new lifeblood into the political process because multi-level systems offer 
political actors potential new arenas in which to compete, as the enthusiastic 
proponents suggest. 
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Most European democracies employ a multi-level system of 
governance. They provide several challenges and important opportunities for 
electoral accountability and for our understanding of representative 
democracy. Nevertheless multi-level systems of governance also raise serious 
concerns about their democratic deficit. Not only citizens but also elected 
MPs find it hard to attribute responsibility to certain actors correctly when 
actual policy-making processes are obfuscated by the number of state and 
non-state actors, lobbyists, specialists and the like who participate in it. This, 
of course, has important consequences for the legitimacy of the policy-
making process. 
It remains an open question as to how effective the various mechanisms 
of democratic control over such policy-making processes can be and under 
what conditions multi-level systems will ever be able to fulfill their promises 
in overcoming the democratic deficit and bringing government home to the 
people. Under what conditions and in what ways can citizens hold which 
political actors accountable and what are the political consequences of this 
situation? My argument will be that we cannot reliably answer these 
questions if we do not understand how citizens make decisions in the context 
of a multi-level system and particularly how they judge the performance of 
governments on various levels in their decision-making process.  
All too often outcomes of elections are interpreted as if these elections 
had been held in isolation – without referring to their status in a multi-level 
system of governance. We speak of “contamination effects” or “interaction 
effects” between two electoral arenas if the null hypothesis of independence 
between both arenas cannot be sustained, i.e., when one electoral arena 
“contaminates” the result in another electoral arena. For instance, the 
national electoral stage might have implications for a sub-national electoral 
stage, or presidential elections might have an impact on parliamentary 
elections (or vice versa). Nevertheless, political scientists have yet to build a 
body of knowledge about why or when one electoral arena plays a larger or 
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smaller role in shaping other electoral arenas – an important first step in 
understanding the complex nature of preference aggregation in representative 
democracies through popular elections and accountability in systems of multi-
level governance. In what follows I will briefly summarize my first attempts 
to structure the literature and the hypotheses therein as well as those I have 
developed myself. Finally, I will present some ideas on how to draft a 
research design for a grant proposal to test those hypotheses in a comparative 
setting. 
Individual Decision-making Process in Multi-level 
Systems 
Under what conditions do voters distinguish between national and sub-
national policy responsibilities and employ them systematically in their 
decision-making calculus? In a multi-level system of governance, in which 
national and sub-national elections need not necessarily be concurrent, voters 
may cast their votes to bring about a level-specific executive. Citizens might 
base their decision-making process on different determinants in different 
elections even for the (more or less) same set of parties. Do voters 
differentiate between national and sub-national elections? Do their decisions 
have the same dynamics or are they systematically different? Under what 
conditions are these processes linked and what political implication does this 
have for election outcomes, party strategies and so forth? 
In what follows I will distinguish previous research into two strands: 
unitarists and federalists. The unitarists make assumptions which draw heavily 
on the referendum voting model (Key 1964, Kramer 1971, Tufte 1978) 
which suggests that electoral outcome at all levels of governance depend on 
the performance of the national government. The more popular the national 
government is the more likely voters are to cast their vote for the 
incumbents. Thus even co-partisans of the national government are expected 
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to do well in state elections when times are good. Following this line of 
thought, strong hierarchical contamination effects are expected. The national 
arena contaminates the sub-national arena (although there is some evidence 
of ‘reverse-coattail’ effects in which sub-national performance assessments 
influence the individual decision-making process in national elections; see 
e.g. Gélineau and Remmer 2005). Without spelling out the micro 
foundations very clearly the literature on political cycles and second-order 
elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Kousser 2004; Reif and Schmitt 
1980; Schmitt 2005) also employs the same assumptions regarding the impact 
of the national arena on sub-national elections. Voters use sub-national 
elections to punish or reward the national government, employing their 
current evaluation of the national government as a heuristic. They can punish 
their governments either by not going to vote for them the next time around 
or, particularly if there are identifiable alternatives, by registering a vote for a 
viable alternative. Moreover, McDonald and Budge (2005) find that, 
independently of their performance in office, incumbents lose on average 
about 2.3 percent. Thus, some of the negative effects in the literature that are 
typically attributed to bad performance by the incumbent at the national 
level, might capture the long run dynamics of electoral cycles (Anderson 
2007). Apart from some evidence on the macro-level, we have not really 
identified on the individual-level the mechanisms that generate these 
dynamics. 
The second strand of the literature comprises the federalists. Their 
mantra is that for state-specific questions voters require state-specific answers. 
Voters want to have things done differently at the state level and therefore 
employ different criteria or respond to cues that differ from the well-studied 
national-level ones (e.g. Abedi und Siaroff 1999; Jeffrey und Hough 2001; 
Pallares und Keating 2003; Selb 2006). Following this line of research the 
national arena is not expected to contaminate the sub-national arena. State 
elections should be determined by state-level factors. If the federalists are 
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correct then we should find that political parties at the state-level have a 
tendency to deviate from the national party line in order to formulate specific 
policy proposals for the sub-national level. Parties might also employ different 
campaign strategies in order to compete effectively at different levels of 
governance, which has implications for potential coalition formation 
processes as well. 
Both literatures agree that what we know from electoral behavior 
research in single-level elections is that individual vote-choice decisions 
depend not only on national performance evaluations, as the unitarists 
suggest, or on sub-national factors, as the federalists recommend, but on 
preferences for parties, candidates and issues. 
I am interested not only in individual-level determinants but in the 
conditions under which the national arena has an impact on the sub-national 
arena. The size of a contamination effect should depend on how difficult it is 
to correctly attribute policy responsibility to particular political actors in the 
policy-making process. The assignment of responsibility is a necessary 
condition for accountability. But more often than not voters misattribute 
responsibilities for governmental actions and thus hold an actor accountable 
for something he or she is not responsible for. In multi-level systems of 
government, policy-making responsibility is often shared across or even 
within levels of governance through mechanisms such as coalition 
governments and split executives (cohabitation or divided government). 
Powell and Whitten (1993) show that a country’s formal institutional 
structure moderates the extent to which citizens can hold their incumbents 
responsible. Further studies, all operating on the macro-level, support the 
notion (Anderson 1995; Chappell and Veiga 2000; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Whitten and Palmer 1999) that 
the nature of clarity of responsibility within the national government 
moderates the extent to which citizens hold national governments 
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responsible. This literature mostly employs measures of national economic 
conditions but one could simply use popularity data.   
Multi-level systems of governance undermine the potential for citizens 
to hold policy makers accountable (retrospectively) or provide (pre-electoral) 
coalitions with a clear mandate (prospectively) to govern. The actual division 
of power is potentially spread out vertically (lower vs. upper house) and 
horizontally (national vs. sub-national). Thus multi-level systems of 
governance impose high informational demands because the clarity of 
responsibility is diffused. Moreover, in order to form prospective or 
retrospective evaluations, citizens need to somehow distinguish the track 
record of the executive at different levels. Moreover, multi-level systems 
imply multiple elections. In particular, if these elections are not held at the 
same time, the likelihood of voter fatigue among satisfied voters as well as 
increased turnout rates among protest voters is high, yielding hard-to-predict 
election outcomes at the sub-national level. 
As well as having an impact on the voter side multi-level systems of 
governance provide incentives for policy makers to engage in systematic 
credit-taking or blame-shifting across levels of governance (Anderson 2006). 
These actions make it even more difficult for citizens to correctly attribute 
blame and credit for the past or expected future performance of particular 
policy makers. Without a particular supportive electoral context, elections 
become clumsy instruments with which to hold policy makers accountable 
within a multi-level system of governance. 
While in terms of legitimacy voters are free to misattribute credit and 
blame and to decide to reward or punish the incumbent on whatever basis 
(Manin 1997), institutions that blur responsibilities are more problematic 
because voters are stuck with them. Thus, I expect to find strong 
contamination effects when the clarity of responsibility is high. Under such 
conditions non-sophisticated voters are not expected to distinguish between 
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national and sub-national policy responsibilities while sophisticated voters 
might have the capability and motivation to do it.  
A basic assumption is that the limited capacity and motivation to absorb 
complex information about politics (such as how federalism actually works) 
into the decision-making process necessarily implies that we could reasonably 
expect that heuristic performance or popularity judgments about the 
government are all that should have an impact on an individual’s decision-
making process and all we could reasonably expect. Reward or punishment 
attributions as an electoral mechanism for holding governments accountable 
would be most likely to be detectable in general performance evaluations of 
the government. By doing this even politically innocent citizens have a 
legitimate way to hold the government accountable retrospectively, or to 
provide them with a mandate prospectively. 
At the individual-level the clarity of responsibility argument should 
therefore focus on heuristics. For instance in concurrent elections the national 
agenda is likely to dominate the media and voters might therefore find it 
easier to make evaluations of the national government or other national-level 
determinants than to access sub-national factors.  
Another heuristic is provided by the political composition of the 
national and the sub-national levels of government. If both governments are 
held by the same parties then the attribution of responsibility is potentially 
easier. In this case voters really do not need to know much about the 
structure and rules of the political process in a multi-level system. The same 
parties are responsible for the policy output and are likely to be punished or 
rewarded depending on citizens’ performance evaluations of the government. 
Using data from eight Berlin state elections between 1976 and 2001 I can 




Envisioned Research Design 
So far there is not much comparative research out there. Instead, most of the 
studies focus on the aggregate level in a particular country. The lack of data 
availability hinders individual-level studies, let alone comparative approaches 
on this level. State-level elections are so far not well studied but they are 
necessary for our understanding of accountability in multi-level systems. If 
there is individual-level data at all than there are single-shot pre-election 
studies. These studies can provide us with evidence about micro-level 
determinants and micro-foundations of the aggregate-level studies. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of causality is not straightforward in cross-
sectional data. Thus the observed relationships remain pretty silent in terms of 
one’s ability to interpret them causally. Even if we find that partisanship and 
regional or national performance evaluations do determine vote choice, to 
what degree are they independent of one another? It is certainly conceivable 
that performance evaluations are biased by partisanship in the same way that 
evaluations of the state of the economy are biased (see Anderson et a. 2004; 
Wlezien et al. 1997) or, on the other hand, performance indicators may 
systematically bias a voter’s answer to party preference evaluations (which 
would provide an incentive for politicians to make good policy and govern 
effectively). If the sub-national track record does not have an impact on vote-
choice decisions then why should regional governments bother to work hard? 
(Should questions of this sort be systematically asked of members of state 
parliaments?) 
There is a real need to separate these factors out, and hence I make a 
plea for gathering panel data within an election cycle between two national 
(and sub-national) elections. It is also not clear what the benchmark election 
is for those citizens’ evaluations. So far most of the literature simply assumes 
that Presidential elections have an impact on Congressional elections, national 
on sub-national elections and so forth. If voters find the local situation more 
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easily accessible than the national one then this assumption is questionable. 
There is also research arguing that coattail effects might actually be reversed 
(Ames 1994; Gélineau and Remmer 2005; Samuels 2000) Therefore sub-
national performance evaluations should be included in the survey (on or off-
line, depending on funding).  
Since parties do typically make the first move in dealing with various 
incentives in multi-level systems, a systematic analysis of party policy at the 
national, compared to the sub-national level, and possibly a separate study of 
the attitudes of members of parliament might supplement the individual-level 
data. 
Case Selection 
Again I find a conflict here. On the one hand I am interested in individual-
level mechanism. It would be nice to pin down some form of generalizable 
attribution processes and decision-making determinants that are comparable 
across countries. This would suggest implementing such panel studies using a 
very different design, showing that, no matter how different theses countries 
are, we might be able to pin down a basic repertoire of how voters hold their 
politicians accountable in a system of multi-level governance. Potential 
countries for examination would be Spain and Germany. On the other hand, 
it would be naïve to assume that these individual-level mechanisms occur in 
an institutional vacuum. Moreover, there are always potential perils when 
analyzing election outcomes in isolation. In trying to get a handle on 
institutional variations that might have an impact (time-line of elections, 
electoral system, party system, constitutional design) I would rather opt for a 
most-similar design, focusing on some aspects while holding other features 
constant through the selection of cases. Potential countries for this study 
would be Germany and Austria. 
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